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A basic challenge of contemporary thought is to better understand the 
origin, persistence, and future course of international/ comparative law.  I 
suggest that a foundational step is to begin treating the law as a 
philosophical matter.  I propose that comparative and international legal 
theory require a distinct methodology that is as integrated and systematic 
as positivism, but which better recognizes the dialectic interdependence 
of normative and empirical and the metaphysical interdependence of 
theory and practice.  Philosophical Method, as systematized by R.G. 
Collingwood, promotes the dialectic over the eristic, looks for overlap 
rather than definitive scientific classification, argues for comprehensive 
philosophy rather than isolated theory and recognizes a proper logical 
metaphysics of absolute and relative presuppositions rather than a 
positive legal practice isolated from its inherent philosophical 
determinants. 
 
I. THE ‘STATE OF THE ART’ 
                                                 
1 This proposal is written in reaction to discussion in a seminar on the 
current state of international and comparative legal theory, which took place on 
July 12, 2008 at the 25th anniversary celebration for the Lauterpacht Center at 
Cambridge University.  This session suggested to me that many of the concerns 
raised at the gathering by theorists and practitioners might be addressed more 
comprehensively by an integrated and systematic competitive methodology 
acting as an alternative to the core positivism that determines the major variants 
of current international thinking.  I offer this proposal in order to begin a 
discussion of whether Philosophical Method, as herein described, might ‘fill this 
bill.’    
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Questions of legal governance are transcending state and 
inter-state systems and becoming global.  Legal practice is no 
longer adequately defined by a strict norm of state sovereignty and 
the process of ‘peaceful’ international cooperation, but must justify 
norms, rules, and principles with various levels of definition and 
interdependence both within and outside a primary focus on the 
‘Westphalian’ state structure.  There is also the evolution of new 
organizations, courts, and tribunals to consider.  The international 
jurisprudence that these novel international governance systems 
are creating must be understood in all its complexity, as well as the 
fundamental concern for the dialectic interaction between these 
institutions and the ideas that they create and that create them.  
International and comparative law need to respond to this growing 
complexity through the recognition that the current focus on valid 
practice, as the primary foundation of both empirical and 
normative analysis, must be transcended.  Such a response is 
necessary because the most challenging questions of global 
governance, those connected with, for example, globalization, the 
transmutation of sovereignty, the international rights of the 
individual, or the intervention of one state in the affairs of another, 
are fundamentally ‘philosophical’ rather than technical or scientific 
questions, and have a distinct ontology requiring a specific method 
and epistemological assumptions that transcend the narrowly 
positivist predispositions of contemporary transnational law. 
If we have more international human rights than are 
currently recognized in global legal practice, we need to be able to 
recognize a potential legal right, and how it gains legal status.  If 
globalization is more than an economic phenomenon and should 
integrate human rights or environmental protection, then reciprocal 
trade may not be a proper vehicle for the constitutionalization of 
the international system.  But, if it is not, then we need agreed-
upon standards to make judgments and recognize a better 
governance alternative.  If sovereignty is a principled end-in-itself, 
to be preserved as essential to the international system, then we 
need to be ready to sacrifice other ends to its power in the law of 
international practice.  However, if sovereignty  is a process-norm 
or means to other ends that can be sacrificed for a more persuasive 
legal organizing principle, without destroying the inherent stability 
of the international legal system, then we need a way to first tell 
the difference between principle and process as two normative 
categories in order  to understand how these types of norms 
interact.  
For example, only with a higher level of normative 
complexity than presently exists will we be able to effectively 
decipher and synthesize a fuller understanding of the relationship 
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 of sovereignty, intervention, and self-determination.  Overall, we 
need a new way to organize ideas in order to reasonably argue as 
to whether moral principles should continue to be lead by practice 
or transcend practice in the international and comparative law of 
the 21st century.  
With Matti Koskenniemi, we can no longer afford to 
assume “that the problems of theory are non-problems and that the 
sociological and normative issues of world order can best be 
treated by closely sticking to one’s doctrinal task of analyzing 
valid law.”2  Instead, in order to argue for a proposed global legal 
right, we will need to understand the dialectically related concepts 
inherent in its connection to morality, politics, and foundational 
agency or ‘humanity in the person.’  To justify a consistent policy 
argument for intervention that does not ebb and flow with practice 
but anticipates it, we will need to set legal standards and justify 
them within a deeper system of anticipatory metaphysical 
presuppositions than is allowed by the superficial and strictly 
retrospective focus of legal positivism.  To assess why 
globalization is proceeding for the international economy but 
lagging behind in terms of human rights or the protection of the 
natural world, we need to understand concepts such as ‘free trade’, 
‘human dignity’ and ‘sustainability’ through the many overlapping 
categories of interdependent classification that define their 
philosophical genus and are necessary for a complete sense of their 
joint and individual characters.  
International and comparative law is swiftly becoming an 
interdependent system of concepts and contexts with overlapping 
philosophical complexity beyond the understanding provided to us 
by a focus on validity, scientific observation, and the inductive 
extrapolation of legal practice alone.  For example, rather than 
assuming that all legal standards can be classified as ‘norms’ and 
instantiated by practice, we may need to have a more detailed 
taxonomy of normative concepts for international and comparative 
law that distinguishes moral principles from  legal principles from 
norms from rules. A more complex philosophical structure is able 
to justify a number of logical routes by which these distinct yet 
interdependent normative standards are made operational within 
legal practice as well as decipher what distinct roles they play in 
the translation of human values into valid law.3 
If human will and moral principle are to lead legal practice, 
we may need to have more well integrated and morally persuasive 
arguments that can decipher and then describe the fundamental 
                                                 
2 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 2-3 (2006). 
3 See John Martin Gillroy, Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Regimes 
and International Tribunals: The Status of “Environmental Sustainability” in 
International Jurisprudence, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006). 
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 presuppositions of our current international legal system while 
suggesting a range of possibilities for the future of governance 
under the rule of law.  Perhaps our task should be not simply to ask 
what international law ‘is’ or what it ‘should be’ but to seek an 
understanding of the dialectic dynamic between its inherent ideas, 
merging theory?4practice, ideas? institutions, and  justice?order 
now within an historical context, and in anticipation of future 
evolution. 
However, the standard point of departure for legal study is 
the validity of its practice.  The literature of both international and 
comparative legal theory traditionally infers norms from practice.  
The emphasis is on the positive nature of the law and its rules, 
processes, and institutions.  There is an inherent assumption that 
this empirical analysis can be examined independently, free of any 
strictly moral or prior normative considerations which constitute a 
separate category of dialectically unrelated scholarship.  This 
latter, separate category of normative argument has emerged, 
however, from within the same post-positivist milieu as its 
empirically-driven counterpart.  Although many normative 
theorists have made headway in understanding the true complexity 
of the international legal system, they have largely accepted the 
proposition that practice is the starting point for legal study and 
that the normative and empirical dimensions of the rule of law 
should be considered distinct dichotomous realms of scientifically 
classified thought and analysis. 5 
Specifically, modern international legal argument is 
dominated by positivist predispositions that undergird most of the 
                                                 
4 I will use this symbol to indicate a dialectic relation between ideas. Here, 
dialectic is defined not just in the formal Hegelian sense but also in the general 
sense that no philosophical concept has its essence in itself alone, but in the 
tension (represented by the small vertical lines) between itself and  its other 
(represented by the arrows in opposition). 
5 My point here is that the core of what is wrong with each type of current 
international and comparative legal theories is that they deny dialectic and begin 
with an assumption of the priority of practice.  This includes all those that call 
their work normative and those who identify themselves as empirical.  For 
example, Terry Nardin, creates a moral argument that begins and ends with legal 
practice.  SeeTERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 
(1983).  Alexander Wendt, protesting that he was only engaged in empirical 
theory, suggested three distinct constructivist models for international practice 
that he called Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian but which have no direct 
connection with any of these philosophers’ writings and still employ a positivist 
method.  See ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS (1999).  Allen Buchanan examines ‘moral foundations’ that also begin 
with legal practice but are built upon the un-argued assertion that justice should 
be based on human rights, which Philosophical Method tells us is incorrectly 
treating a relative presupposition as absolute.  See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE 
LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004). 
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 theoretical schools of ‘international legal theory’ to the detriment 
of a more comprehensive philosophical understanding of the 
foundations and dynamics of global legal practice.  To date, we 
have settled for either the non-philosophical examination of 
validity located in empirical legal practice alone, or for non-
comprehensive and non-dialectic normative arguments that begin 
with law as practice rather than recognize it as a product of the 
dynamics of philosophical ideas, legal institutions, and social 
reality.  Given the current literature, one must ask if we are capable 
of transcending the assumptive structure of positivism that we 
learned as students of the law and which has substantially created 
the intellectual world in which we all live.  If the dynamic between 
our physical surroundings and their metaphysical foundations must 
be studied as an interconnected whole for a true understanding of 
the evolving international rule of law to emerge, then we need to 
approach this study with the proper ontological, epistemological, 
and methodological standards, which, I maintain, we are not now 
doing.  We need to see beyond the surface validity of the law and 
the false dichotomy of normative and positive to find the dynamic 
or dialectic core of the international legal system.  Only then can 
we overcome our positivist prejudices and take a fresh look at the 
origins, persistence, and future of international law. 
 
II. SETTING THE TASK BEFORE US 
 
To enhance the study of legal process and integrate the 
realities of international and comparative law as a philosophical 
subject of analysis, we need to be able to overcome five specific 
tendencies of contemporary legal analysis, which represent the 
core prejudices of an overly simplistic definition of practice.6  
First, our approach to international law should not be satisfied with 
theory replacing philosophy.  Since the positivist revolution of the 
mid-nineteenth century, we all have been trained in distinct 
disciplines to pursue theory adequate only to explaining one’s 
particular corner of the socio-political or legal landscape.  Unlike 
our predecessors in the 17th and 18th century, we no longer seek a 
comprehensive philosophical understanding of how the human 
social milieu came into being, how it shapes and is shaped by the 
individual humans within it, and how and why it renders, in 
particular circumstances, particular institutional and legal 
structures for its persistence over time.  We no longer see our part 
                                                 
6 This analysis seeks to apply, with enhancements, the works of R.G. 
Collingwood.  See generally R.G. COLLINGWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PHILOSOPHICAL 
METHOD (1933) [hereinafter EPM]; R.G. COLLINGWOOD, AN ESSAY ON 
METAPHYSICS (2002) (1940) [hereinafter EM]; R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE NEW 
LEVIATHAN (2005) [hereinafter NL]. 
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 of the theoretical whole within its greater philosophical context 
and as an application of greater socio-legal forces to specific cases 
and controversies.  
When philosophical material is utilized within this isolated 
theoretical exercise, as it sometimes is, it does not involve a 
comprehensive understanding of any philosopher’s greater 
integrated system, but the use of bits and pieces of their exegesis. 
These disembodied components are then applied in isolation from 
one another to make specific contextual points within the modern 
theorist’s argument.  This practice is fostered by positivism, which 
discounts integrated philosophical systems and seeks only 
components of those systems that aid in the understanding of 
specific empirical or normative questions.  But is it our seeming 
satisfaction with these ‘theoretical’ corners or isolated components 
of the greater philosophical space that retards our analytic progress 
in understanding contemporary international law?  
Second, we have moved away from the ancient assumption 
that the core of legal argument is dialectic to one that scholarly 
discourse is essentially eristic with ideological confrontation over 
normative matters being the rule rather than the exception.  We no 
longer start from the assumption that “[i]n a dialectical discussion 
you aim at showing that your own view is one with which your 
opponent really agrees, even if at one time he denied it; or 
conversely that it was yourself and not your opponent who began 
by denying a view with which you really agree . . . .  The essence 
of dialectical discussion is to discuss in the hope of finding that 
both parties to the discussion are right, and that this discovery puts 
an end to the debate.”7 
As the core of positivist political and legal scholarship, 
eristic argument begins with one component of a dichotomized 
pair, for example, empirical without normative, and demands 
separate scholarships for each.  Eristic positivism demands that an 
idea be adequately assessed without benefit of its dialectic counter-
arguments.  Instead of assuming that normative?positive, 
process?principle, or order?justice are integrated dialectic pairs 
where one component cannot be assessed in the absence of the 
other, and instead of seeking a synthesis solution where principles 
are refined within the dialectic itself through interactive political 
and legal debate, we assume that discourse and argument are about 
forming and dichotomizing distinct points of view where the value 
of any position is its internal purity alone.  
As purveyors of eristic legal debate in the study of practice 
we no longer seek agreement where none exists, but the victory of 
one point of view or principle over the other.  Instead of 
associating an argument’s integrity with the active interaction of 
                                                 
7  NL, supra note 6, at 181-82. 
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 concepts and agreements through synthesis, in eristic discourse we 
define a policy’s integrity from, and also within, each distinct side 
of the issue.  Eristic argument discourages debate and abhors 
synthesis because any movement from strictly interpreted and 
defined principle within one detachable side of the argument is 
defeat for that side, ceding victory to the other. 
Third, eristic positivist methods have given us a primarily 
retrospective legal analysis that focuses on the objective of 
scientific discovery but not the refinement and justification of the 
law as a set of philosophical ideas.  Instead of a ‘science’ of law, 
where the point of scholarship is the discovery of valid practice, 
we should be focused on philosophical method applied to law 
beginning with concepts already known to us at some level of 
sophistication and seek, through dialectic analysis, the refinement 
of our understanding of them and their inherent complexity as 
applied ideas.  
Our search should be for comprehensive philosophical 
paradigms as a starting point in an effort to seek the “generic 
essence” of any specific legal concept.  Instead of a concentration 
on the observable surface, the search should be for that “essence” 
indigenous to the idea itself and revealed through progressive 
philosophical analysis.  Legal theory, as analyzed from the 
scientific perspective, is generally considered to be about the 
discovery of valid practice, which is a fit subject of study in and of 
itself, being positive and based upon observation and induction.  
This superficial definition of practice, and even the norms that 
regulate it, are considered to be the product of positive action and 
choice, separable from foundational philosophical considerations, 
and revealed by the examination of empirical phenomena alone.  
Rather than refinement toward philosophical essence, the 
‘discovery’ of valid practice is, from this perspective, the true 
expression of the application of reason to the world, unlike 
normative concerns prior to practice which, if they exist at all, are 
assumed to contribute only to an environment of opinion and 
ideology rather than argument and truth. 
The search for generic essence, the refinement process, is 
made accessible by the fourth characteristic of philosophical legal 
argument.  Unlike scientific concepts that can be definitively 
classified, for example, by their genus and species, philosophical 
concepts overlap and create a scale of forms with their dialectic 
interaction and synthesis.  A genus within scientific method 
contains distinct species, which is its purpose.  These species 
classifications sort, separate, and effectively allow the scientist to 
study each one independently.  Within philosophical method, a 
macro-concept like sovereignty may be considered a ‘genus’ from 
the standpoint of philosophical method, but its inherent ideas, or 
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 species, like ‘self-determination’ or ‘effective control’, are not 
philosophically independent of one another, nor can they be 
studied separately.  
Because the ‘species’ of a philosophical ‘genus’ have no 
single definitive classification, they are improperly studied as 
scientific or positive concepts alone.8  The idea of the overlap of 
categories into which a single philosophical concept 
simultaneously fits frustrates the scientific classification of social, 
political, and legal ideas into one and only one of those 
observational classifications.  Further, a philosophical concept 
cannot be definitively defined by its empirical surface alone but 
must be understood in terms of both what can be observed and the 
ideas that are below the surface but which define and justify the 
concept.  Approaching international law through philosophical 
method is a multi-faceted effort and needs more than observation 
and induction of any single facet of, for example, the concept of 
justice.  In addition to a study of justice-in-practice, attention needs 
to be paid to the dialectical relations of theory and practice as well 
as  to the various overlapping and dialectically interdependent 
‘species’ of, for example, justice-as-allocation, justice-as-order, 
justice-as-dessert and justice-as-distribution.  In addition, outside 
its genus one may also need to consider the many material and 
metaphysical ideas that share the same legal argument or policy 
design space9 with justice, as, for example, do the ideas of 
obligation, wealth, respect, and human agency.  
With the overlap of categories, philosophical method 
replaces the objective of empirical discovery with the imperative 
of philosophical refinement toward specificity of essence.  The 
progress of the legal concept along this scale of forms toward its 
essence, involves all of those variables that contribute to its 
essence including its dialectic and overlapping relations.  The scale 
of more and more sophisticated definitions of a concept cannot be 
understood, and its essence is essentially denied if the 
philosophical concept is treated as a strictly positive one that can 
be uniquely classified and studied in the absence of dialectic.  If 
we approach even the idea of ‘practice’ as if it has no dialectic 
with principle and does not exhibit overlap and a scale of forms 
toward deciphering its essence, then human understanding of 
practice itself becomes impossible.  In the same way, to seek the 
refinement and justification of the generic essence of the 
international rule of law requires more than treating the law as a 
                                                 
8 EPM, supra note 6, at 41-42. 
9 See generally JOHN MARTIN GILLROY, BREENA HOLLAND & CELIA 
CAMPBELL-MOHN, A PRIMER FOR LAW & POLICY DESIGN: UNDERSTANDING 
THE USE OF PRINCIPLE & ARGUMENT IN ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL RESOURCE 
LAW (2008).  
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 valid, isolated, and static concept, which is what positivism 
prescribes.  “The result of this identification [of essence] is that 
every form, so far as it is low in the scale, is to that extent an 
imperfect or inadequate specification of the generic essence, which 
is realized with progressive adequacy as the scale is ascended.”10 
Legal concepts, in this way, should be assumed to form an 
escalator of conceptual refinement as they move closer to their 
generic essence through philosophical argument and dialectic 
synthesis.  This linkage between distinct levels of overlapping 
complexity creates a ‘scale of forms’ for that concept, 
 
. . . [F]or if the species of a philosophical genus 
overlap, the distinction between the known and 
the unknown, which in a non-philosophical 
subject-matter involves a difference between two 
mutually exclusive classes of truths, in a 
philosophical subject-matter implies that we may 
both know and not know the same thing; a 
paradox which disappears in the light of the 
notion of a scale of forms of knowledge, where 
coming to know means coming to know in a 
different and better way.11  
 
Specifically, with the assumption of a scale of forms for the 
world of legal ideas, analysis as part of synthesis can use 
philosophical method to create ever deeper definitions of a 
concept’s nature as persuasive products of dialectic argument.  In 
effect, this will move any concept to ever higher levels of 
complexity in terms of our understanding of that idea.  Meanwhile, 
it raises its scale of complexity and understanding on a foundation 
of those presuppositions necessary to our knowledge of the 
concept and its inherent essence and logic.  
Lastly, in relation to the deciphering of a scale of forms for 
a concept, we should acknowledge that the search for essence 
creates a metaphysical dimension to the law that distinguishes 
relative from absolute presuppositions.  Our current world of 
empirical positivism, having separated and isolated the evidence of 
valid practice as the primary component of its research, analysis, 
and method, has neglected the critical importance within all 
systems of argument (i.e. both scientific and philosophical), of a 
set of metaphysical presuppositions or assumptions upon which to 
base and justify applied argument.  
Specifically, on a scale of forms, a series of relative 
presuppositions lead, finally, to an absolute presupposition that 
                                                 
10 EPM, supra note 6, at 61.  
11 Id. at 161. 
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 defines the core ‘truth’ of the concept.  The absolute 
presupposition is the moral primitive of the concept, its essence,12 
and necessary to the concept’s integrity, with no further 
presuppositions informing it.  The scale of forms, built into a 
metaphysical logic, while not necessary to scientific discovery, is 
critical to philosophical justification.  Seeking an ever greater 
depth for legal concepts responds to the needs of a progressively 
more complex and sophisticated system of interlocking 
ideas?institutions to be analyzed and produces a much more 
complex definition of legal practice.  This depth toward generic 
essence is also necessary to make legal ideas more reasonable or 
persuasive in contemporary jurisprudence and policy argument as 
the international rule of law gains needed complexity in a 
globalizing world.  
Within positivism, a metaphysics of absolute and relative 
presuppositions is replaced by layers of equally relative 
presuppositions, all assumed to be true without argument or 
analysis.13  This, in fact, confuses the role of absolute and relative 
presuppositions and ignores their philosophical character, 
metaphysical interrelations, and dynamic dialectic evolution along 
the scale of forms necessary to legal ideas.  When a policy 
argument, for example, assumes all its presuppositions to be 
relative, it is not assuming a dynamic dialectic connection between 
them, but a circular logic, as each relative presupposition is an 
‘answer’ to one level of questions, while, as a presupposition, it 
poses questions for the next level of similarly relative 
presuppositions.  By assuming that all of these relative 
presuppositions are true without analysis, the purpose of any 
inherent metaphysical scale of forms is defeated, for it is 
impossible to create a logical scale of forms for the intellectual 
refinement of a concept without being able to sort and justify 
connections between its inherent presuppositions.  It is also the 
case that without a single common and fundamental foundation as 
a point of departure for the repeated dialectical progression 
between theory and practice toward essential refinement, practice 
remains superficial and correspondingly less useful in an ever 
more complex international legal system. 
Fundamental presuppositions are, rather, singular and 
foundational within the system of metaphysics for any 
                                                 
12 A central idea of philosophical method is in seeking conceptual essence, 
even if it is never fully achieved. Although we may not ever know a concept as a 
‘thing-in-itself,’ we can understand its inherent dialectical complexity, its 
overlap with other concepts, and its dynamic progress toward a more and more 
essential understanding of its essence. 
13 EM, supra note 6, at 154, 176.  
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 philosophical concept, and are necessary for an adequate argument 
or its application to practice.  
 
 Metaphysics is concerned with absolute 
presuppositions.  We do not acquire absolute 
presuppositions by arguing; on the contrary, 
unless we have them already arguing is 
impossible to us.  Nor can we change them by 
arguing; unless they remained constant all our 
arguments would fall to pieces.  We cannot 
confirm ourselves in them by ‘proving’ them; it 
is proof that depends on them, not they on proof. 
. . .  We must accept them and hold firmly to 
them; we must insist on presupposing them in all 
our thinking without asking why they should be 
thus accepted, [b]ut not without asking what they 
are.14  
 
Specifically, in a world that acknowledges the 
philosophical dimensions of human reason, there are both relative 
and absolute presuppositions in every facet of human life.  An 
absolute presupposition is one that “stands, relative to all questions 
to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer.”15  
These exist, however, only at the most primitive and essential level 
of conceptual understanding, and are fundamental components in a 
greater logical-philosophical system of relative presuppositions 
that are dynamic both within themselves, on the scale of forms, 
and with other interrelated concepts that connect theory to practice 
through dialectic linkage.  These absolute presuppositions are 
necessary in and of themselves to argument, discourse, and the 
logical structure of the social or legal system, but can exist 
untested by argument only to the extent that they are nested within 
a system of relative presuppositions which are constantly so tested.  
Absolute presuppositions should also be openly acknowledged by 
the analyst, and tested themselves, in terms of their ability to 
support a logically intact and therefore persuasive argument. 
In effect, because of a reliance on a narrow definition of 
empirical practice as a source of both normative and positive legal 
argument, we, who study and use international law, have accepted 
an underlying set of relative presuppositions related to the 
observational history of the practice of, for example, sovereignty, 
intervention, justice and globalization that are treated as absolute 
presuppositions.  This grants us neither a scale of forms with a 
dynamic dialectic nor an analyzed metaphysics as an integrated 
                                                 
14 Id. at 173. 
15 Id. at 31. 
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 system of logical concepts to undergird international law as it faces 
new nor more demanding global challenges. 
 
III. A VERY MODEST PROPOSAL 
 
To create a more vital international law for the new century 
the field must be philosophically invigorated through the 
enhancement of the conventional positivist influence in the five 
areas just discussed, by promoting:  
 
1. Comprehensive Philosophy over a Compartmentalized    
     Theory; 
2. Dialectic Argument over Eristic; 
3. Refinement of Ideas over the Imperative of Discovery; 
4. Overlap of Concepts over their Definitive Classification; 
5. An Essential Metaphysics of Absolute and Relative  
     Presuppositions over a Primary Dependence on Surface     
                                       Validity. 
 
However, this begs the question of whether we are capable 
of thinking outside of our positive predispositions.  What if the 
study of ‘norms’ as dialectically related by philosophical method 
has been so overtaken by a social science of superficial practice 
with a core positive norm of validity that we cannot escape the idea 
that the logical separation of law and morals16 leads to the 
inevitable scientific classification of these concepts as distinct and 
independent ‘species?’  This is the basis for the conventional claim 
that law and morals are separable concepts, where each ought to 
have its own distinct body of scholarship.  What if the scientific 
world view is so ingrained in our predispositions toward the 
analysis of concepts in our field that the primary focus of our 
energies will continue to remain the positive and retrospective 
analysis of practice?  Are we capable of changing our essential 
point of view to rediscover the fundamentals of international and 
comparative law?  
After all, our training comes from within this tradition and 
does not routinely consider the dialectical interrelationships of the 
legal and philosophical, or the metaphysical and material context 
of socio-political concepts.  If, in both the scholarly and practical 
context, the law and its inherent policy debate are assumed to be 
the product of non-philosophical, eristic arguments about practice 
rather than the synthesis of principles and process evolving within 
a dialectical scale of forms, how do we overcome these inherent 
                                                 
16 See the Hart—Fuller debate.  See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1957-1958); see also Lon 
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 630 (1958). 
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 prejudices and create a stronger definition of the law?  What are 
we to do if we hope to transcend our age with its epistemological 
blinkers and metaphysical blinders? 
We might all agree that it is too late to stop the 
specialization of fields and the march of scientific method that has 
created the intellectual environment in which we learn and teach, 
but if our contemporary context is inhibiting the full use of 
philosophical method, we may need to look back to a ‘pre-
positivist era’ when this was not the case, to see if its philosophical 
systems can be understood as paradigms and then applied to our 
current legal debates, with more essential and comprehensive 
results.  From the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century, 
before the positivism of Bentham and Austin gained dominance of 
the legal landscape and when the intellectual world-view was 
inherently one more akin to what is here defined as Philosophical 
Method, assuming dialectic and the refinement of moral concepts 
on a scale of forms, scholarship and its application both sought to 
replace revelation with reason in matters of the physical and 
philosophical universe.  Perhaps by utilizing these systems of 
thought, created from a set of assumptions akin to Collingwood’s 
Philosophical Method, we can make better progress in completing 
this objective for comparative and international law.   
These thinkers operated in an atmosphere in which the task 
was to create comprehensive philosophical models where context 
and ideas interacted dialectically within the socio-legal landscape.  
Whether classified as empiricists, like David Hume, or idealists, 
like Immanuel Kant, philosophers of this era treated the human 
socio-legal context as a philosophical subject, acknowledging, 
even in a search for a science of human social life, an effort to 
create a comprehensive and logically integrated philosophical 
system.  Philosophical systems created in this era were based on a 
predisposition toward the dialectical relations of ideas and a search 
for persuasive arguments about the absolute and relative 
presuppositions that would increase our knowledge of what is 
essential about an idea within its scale of forms.  This was a time 
when the scholar was not a lawyer, or scientist, or economist, but a 
philosopher, regardless of whether they were trying to chart the 
heavens, understand human nature, decode chemical reactions, find 
the origin of government, or analyze theoretical mathematics.  
There were few hard divisions to the academy or to one’s thought 
or writing and although we may not be able to go back to this 
environment, we can transplant it through the philosophical system 
logically integrated within its intellectual atmosphere and still 
available to us. 
Consider that Thomas Hobbes in his argument for 
Leviathan demonstrate Philosophical Method by beginning with 
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optical physics followed by  the psychological origins of the 
human will, and later moving on to describe the individual and his 
social context simultaneously in terms of its material, political, 
moral, and spiritual interdependence.  For Hobbes, concepts like 
liberty, self-preservation, and consent are simultaneously principle 
and process; they are both normative and empirical and supportive 
of justice and order.  By assuming that we can take these pre-
defined systems of thought, not created for application to policy or 
law but effective for us toward this end, we may be able to move 
past the retrospective prejudice of existing legal practice to the 
integration of Philosophical Method, Pre-Positivists Paradigms, 
and Policy Arguments for Legal Design, using different 
philosophical paradigms to represent distinct sets of values and 
their logical entailments in codified international and comparative 
contexts.  
Applying paradigms to specific issues in law would then be 
a way, be it an indirect one, to apply pre-positivist philosophical 
method to the design and construction of law and policy for the 
new century.  In effect, through what I will call Philosophical-
Policy And Legal Design,17 the philosophical systems of that era 
can be combined with the modern tools of legal design from 
existing practice to provide a vehicle for the contemporary 
interaction of theory?practice that may provide a new 
methodology, as powerful and logically consistent as positivism 
that is applicable to concrete policy and law, but is more 
encouraging to the full understanding of humanity and its legal 
systems. Might we yet be able to transcend our ingrained and 
impoverished positivist predispositions and, with a new 
methodology, ascertain if we might be missing a range of essential 
insights into the past, present, and complex future of the 
international rule of law? 
 
17 See GILLROY ET AL., supra note 9; see also JOHN MARTIN GILLROY, 
JUSTICE & NATURE: KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND 
THE LAW (2002), for my attempt to put this suggestion into action for 
environmental policy.  I have also applied Philosophical Method and 
Philosophical-Policy to International Law in an article, John Martin Gillroy, 
Justice-As-Sovereignty: David Hume and the Origins of International Law, 78 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 429 (2007),  and in a book manuscript on the same subject, 
tentatively entitled THE GENESIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SOCIAL 
CONVENTION: AN APPLICATION OF HUME’S PHILOSOPHICAL-POLICY TO 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author).  
 
 
 
